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RULE 10b-5 IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT-MATERIALITY,
SCIENTER AND DAMAGES: NELSON v.
SERWOLD
I. INTRODUCTION
The Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (hereinafter the Act) was en-
acted to protect the general investing public by preventing unfair and
inequitable practices. The Act is also designed to make control of se-
curities transactions reasonably effective and complete.2 In particular,
section 10(b) 3 and rule lOb-5 4 guard against fraud in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
The landmark case of Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder5 effectively limited
the scope of rule lOb-5 actions by requiring scienter as a necessary ele-
ment to impose liability for damages.' The Court defined scienter as
an intent to deceive, defraud or manipulate on the part of the defend-
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 (a)-(kk) (1976).
2. Id § 78(b).
3. Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(j) (1976), makes it
unlawful for one "[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
. .. , any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules
and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors."
4. Rule lOb-5 was promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission pursuant to the
grant of rulemaking authority in § 10(b) and provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances
under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
5. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
6. Hochfelder did not decide whether scienter is a requirement in an action for injunc-
tive relief. Id. at 193 n.12.
Although rule lob-5 itself does not provide for a private cause of action, civil liability is
now well established. See, e.g., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730
(1975); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972); Superintendent
of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971). However, prior to Hochfelder
there had never been agreement among the circuits as to whether scienter was a necessary
element of a lOb-5 cause of action, or whether mere negligent conduct was sufficient. See
note 55 infra and accompanying text.
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 12
ant.7 However, it is unclear whether recklessness would satisfy the
Hochfelder scienter requirement. The Hochfelder Court expressly de-
clined to decide whether recklessness would constitute scienter suffi-
cient for civil liability under rule lOb-5 and section 10(b).8 The Ninth
Circuit, however, in the recent case of Nelson v. Serwold9 did decide
that the definition of scienter included knowledge'0 or recklessness on
the part of a defendant. It thus potentially broadened the scope of lia-
bility in lOb-5 actions. In analyzing the lOb-5 action before it, the
Ninth Circuit also held that the rescissory theory"I is a proper method
for measuring losses in a lOb-5 action. In using this theory to give
plaintiff the maximum amount recoverable, the Ninth Circuit has thus
continued to focus on the defendant's wrongful conduct, rather than on
the plaintiff's losses, in assessing relief.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
Kenneth N. Nelson (Nelson) sued defendants' 2 on June 20, 1972 for
damages for fraudulent misrepresentations made by defendants in
7. 425 U.S. at 193.
8. The Bochfelder definition of scienter was expressly limited to its facts. Id. at 193 n.12.
The Court did not decide whether recklessness would constitute scienter since, in that partic-
ular case, the plaintiff premised liability on a negligence theory and acknowledged that the
defendants did not engage in intentional misconduct. The Court was not, therefore,
squarely presented with the recklessness question:
In this opinion the term "scienter" refers to a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In certain areas of the law recklessness is considered
to be a form of intentional conduct for purposes of imposing liability for some act. We
need not address here the question whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is
sufficient for civil liability under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5.
Id.
9. 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 47 U.S.L.W. 3159 (U.S. Jul. 26,
1978)(No. 78-182).
10. Hochfelder did not specifically hold that knowledge by the defendant of the wrongful
act was sufficient to satisfy the scienter standard, although the Court did "strongly suggest"
that § 10(b) was directed at knowing or intentional misconduct. 425 U.S. at 197. See also
note 82 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 91-96 and 103-09 infra and accompanying text.
12. The defendants were also sued for alleged misrepresentations in violation of rule lob-
5 in Lanning v. Serwold, 474 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1973).
The Lanning opinion is dated Feb. 12, 1973, prior to the opinion handed down in Nelson.
It is interesting to note that the attorneys who represented Nelson also represented the plain-
tiff-appellant, Lanning. Lanning averred that he entered into an agreement in 1971 with two
shareholders of Poulsbo Rural Telephone Ass'n to purchase 136 shares at $15 per share.
Rule lob-5 was alleged to have been violated because the defendants had made false repre-
sentations to the two shareholders in attempting to frustrate the proposed sale. Lanning
asserted that the Serwolds wanted them to make a larger profit on the shares and so en-
couraged them to hold on to their shares. The Court of Appeals held that a good cause of
action was stated and remanded the case to the district court.
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purchasing stock from the estate of Nels Nelson, of which Nelson was
an heir. The defendants, husband and wife, were directors of Poulsbo
Rural Telephone Association (PRTA), a Washington corporation.
They were members of a control group holding 56% of PRTA stock.
This control group' 3 took rein over the corporation to modernize it and
develop it into a marketable enterprise.1
4
In 1962, thirty-six shares of PRTA stock were found in the estate of
Nels Nelson.' 5 Earl Korth (Korth), a Wisconsin attorney for the estate,
wrote to PRTA asking for information as to the status of the stock.
Serwold accepted the letter addressed to the company but did not re-
spond in his capacity as a corporate officer. Instead, he referred the
letter to his personal attorney, J. Paul Coie (Coie), who in turn re-
sponded that "we. . .may be in a position to offer $5.00 per share."' 6
Thereafter Korth wrote Coie showing ownership in the Nelson estate
and inquiring as to whether any dividends had accrued. Korth re-
ceived no response to this communique for twenty-seven months. In
the interim the Nelson estate was closed, and the certificate was re-
tained by the estate's administrator in a safe deposit box. Coie finally
replied in April 1965, enclosing Serwold's personal check for $180.00,
which represented a purchase price of $5.00 per share, and authorizing
its endorsement upon surrender of the stock certificate for thirty-six
shares. He stated that no dividends had ever been declared and that
none were anticipated.'7
Korth assumed that $5.00 per share represented the fair market value
of the stock and so informed his client.' 8 Coie was apprised of Korth's
assumption when he received a copy of the letter from Korth to the
estate's administrator informing him of the latest information concern-
ing the stock.' 9 After further correspondence, Korth and Coie agreed
in July, 1965 on a purchase price of $6.94 per share, and Coie for-
13. The control group consisted of the Serwolds, who held 30% of the controlling interest
and, among others, J. Paul Coie, Mr. Serwold's personal attorney, who held a 10% beneficial
interest.
14. 576 F.2d at 1334.
15. The stock certificate was issued to R. Norman, but was the property of Nels Nelson,
deceased. Id.
16. Id. at 1335. In the defendants' Petition for Certiorari they state "Korth had requested
the company to transmit his request to 'any source' that could give him the desired informa-
tion." Petition For Writ of Certiorari at 19, Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.
1978). Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's implication, it does not appear unreasonable that
Serwold's attorney would reply.
17. Id. See note 49 infra.
18. Id.
19. Korth wrote to the administrator of the estate stating that he assumed $180.00 repre-
sented the fair market value for the 36 shares. A copy of the letter was sent to Coie. Id.
1978]
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warded another Serwold check for the additional sum in exchange for
the stock certificate. At that time PRTA stock had a book value of
approximately $60.00 per share.2z
Shortly thereafter O.E. Serwold engaged in negotiations for the sale
of the company. As a result of negotiations which began in December
1970 and culminated in 1971, PRTA agreed to an exchange of all its
assets for stock in United Utilities, Inc. The shareholders of PRTA
received twenty-five shares of United Stock, having a total value of
$500.00, for each share of PRTA stock.2'
The plaintiff, as an heir to the Nelson estate, became aware of the
PRTA transaction in 1971 and, after obtaining assignments from other
relatives, brought an action for fraudulent misrepresentation in 1972.
The district court held that the defendants' failure to disclose (1) the
existence of the control group and (2) the group's informal long range
plan to acquire a majority of the company stock in order to modernize
the company for sale, constituted material omissions.22 It held the de-
fendants liable, without finding an intent to deceive, 2Sand awarded
damages based on the highest value of the shares at a reasonable time
after the transaction.24 Plaintiff appealed the award of damages since it
was not based on a rescissory theory which would have required full
disgorgement of defendants' profits. Defendants cross-appealed on the
20. Id For discussion of the relative importance of the term "book value", see notes 44-
47 infra and accompanying text.
21. Id. At the time PRTA stock had a book value of approximately $163.00 per share.
For further discussion, see notes 44-47 infra and accompanying text.
22. Id. at 1336. A necessary element to a lOb-5 cause of action is a showing that the
misrepresentations or omissions were material. For a complete discussion of this issue, see
notes 29-41 infra and accompanying text.
23. The district court's holding predated Hoch/elder, and the court therefore relied upon
the Ninth Circuit's position as stated in White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 734-35 (9th Cir.
1974) that a finding of scienter was not required in order to impose liability under rule lOb-
5. Id. at 729. See also notes 61 & 62 infra and accompanying text.
24. Because the district court classified the culpability of the defendants as neither delib-
erate nor with a "cold-blooded intent," it assessed damages which fell short of disgorging all
of the defendants' profits. Nelson v. Serwold, No. 411-72C2, Findings and Conclusions,
Conclusions of Law, No. 1 (W.D. Wash., Sept. 29, 1975).
The lack of scienter militates against the stricter rule of Myzel v. Fields, .. which calls
for complete disgorgement by persons who deliberately set out to cheat. Rather, the
lack of scienter calls for a lesser measure of damages-more than the difference be-
tween price and market, but one still below the Myzel measure.
The court maintained that within a reasonable time after the sale plaintiff would have dis-
covered the material information. It concluded that December 31, 1967, just over two years
after the transaction, was such a reasonable time. On that date the stock had a book value of
$83.43 per share. Accordingly, the district court awarded plaintiff $3,003.48, plus interest
and costs. 576 F.2d at 1338.
The district court was cognizant of the "insider" factors present, but because it concluded
that liability under lOb-5 had been established, discussion of the insider rule of Texas Gulf
Sulphur was unnecessary. Nelson v. Serwold, No. 411-72C2 (W.D. Wash., Oct. 29, 1974).
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grounds that the omissions were not material and that the Hochfelder
scienter requirement had not been satisfied.
III. REASONING OF THE COURT
As presented on appeal, Nelson v. Serwold2 5 concerns three major
issues: (1) the standard by which materiality of omissions is to be judg-
ed; (2) the level of intent needed to fulfill the Hoehfelder scienter re-
quirement; and (3) the appropriate measure of damages in lOb-5
actions. Nelson is significant in that it is the Ninth Ciruit's first state-
ment in light of Hochfelder upon these critical issues.
A. Materiality of Omission
The regulatory objective of rule lOb-5 is that access to material infor-
mation be enjoyed equally by all investors.26 However, there exists a
wide range of opinion as to the type of information which, if omitted or
misrepresented, will be considered material.27 Indeed, the difficult
problem in lOb-5 actions has not been one of applying settled legal
principles of law to particular facts, but rather of formulating the gov-
25. 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 464 (1978).
26. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) ("The only regulatory objective [of rule lob-5] is that access
to material information be enjoyed equally, but this objective requires nothing more than
the disclosure of basic facts .... ").
27. See, e.g., Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 875 (1977) (representations regarding financial condition of corporation and corpo-
rate merger constitute material information); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977) (statements to the effect that neither company nor its
stock had any worth were material); United States v. Charnay, 537 F.2d 341 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1000 (1976) (manipulation of market value of stock was material informa-
tion); Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974) (corporation's earn-
ings forecast deemed material); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414 (6th Cir. 1974)
(where book value of stock readily available to buyers and no evidence of secret plan by
management to greatly affect stock value, no finding of material omissions since disclosure
required only of existing material facts and information of unusual or extraordinary nature);
Hope v. Hayden-Stone, Inc., 469 F.2d 1060 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (broker's references
to father's relationship with corporation and to possible forthcoming corporate acquisition
not material since not untrue and matter of public record); Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co.,
438 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1970) (failure of brokerage firm to disclose that it was making a
market in the securities it sold to plaintiff was material); SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401
F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969) (results of drill core and
existence of mine held material; materiality includes those facts which affect probable future
of corporation and which affect desire of investor to buy, sell or hold securities); Ellis v.
Carter, 291 F.2d 270 (9th Cir. 1961) (representation that stock carried voice in management
held to be material).
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erning principles,28 and the standard by which to measure materiality is
still one of these unsettled principles.
There has long been a split among the circuits as to whether the
proper standard for judging the materiality of omissions and/or mis-
representations should depend upon what the investor (1) would have
done, (2) could have done, or (3) might have done with that informa-
tion. The Second, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have held that it is
sufficient that the investor might have considered the information im-
portant in his investment decision.29 The Third, Fifth, and Sixth Cir-
cuits, however, have insisted that it be shown that the investor would
have considered the information important.30 The Ninth Circuit has
also adopted the stricter "would" criteria.
31
In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,32 the United States
Supreme Court defined materiality as involving those facts which the
reasonable investor could have or might have considered important in
making a decision to sell.33 Affiliated Ute involved the omission of
28. Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1044 n.15 (7th Cir.), cert denied,
434 U.S. 875 (1977).
29. See Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1171 (2d Cir. 1970) (disclosure of
market making role might have influenced plaintiff's decision to buy stock and was therefore
material); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968)
(statements that corporation was on verge of bankruptcy and that stock was worthless were
misleading and might have affected value of stock); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 642
(7th Cir. 1963) (corporate insiders required to disclose facts of corporation's business which
are unknown to outsiders and which might affect value of stock); but see List v. Fashion
Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462-63 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) (plaintiff would
have sold stock even if he had information that buyer was director of corporation with inside
information of potential sale or merger).
30. See Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 408 (3d Cir. 1974) (50% owner of
stock would attach importance to acquisition negotiations in deciding whether to sell to co-
owner); Arber v. Essex Wire Corp., 490 F.2d 414, 419-20 (6th Cir. 1974) (detailed knowledge
of mechanism for establishing going price and book value not material since information
would not have affected choice of action); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579,
603-05 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974) (failure to disclose stock option on proxy
statement not material since not obviously important to investor and it could not be said that
it would have been given importance in determining course of action).
31. See Lewelling v. First Cal. Co., 564 F.2d 1277, 1279 (9th Cir. 1977) ("[m]ateriality of
omissions is measured by.. .whether a reasonable man would attach importance in deter-
mining his choice of action.. .. ); Robinson v. Cupples Container Co., 513 F.2d 1274, 1277
(9th Cir. 1975) (reasonable investor would not attach importance to statement previously
made but not embodied in stock exchange contract to the effect that defendant would invest
in corporate acquisition); Marx v. Computer Sciences Corp., 507 F.2d 485, 489 n.6 (9th Cir.
1974) (objective test for materiality is whether reasonable man would attach importance to
misrepresentation); Northwest Paper Corp. v. Thompson, 421 F.2d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1969)
(per curiam) (recognized test for materiality is whether reasonable man would attach impor-
tance to certain information in determining his choice of action).
32. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
33. Id. at 153-54.
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facts relating to the value of the stock being sold by the plaintiffs. The
plaintiff sellers, having no investor acumen, relied upon the defendant
brokers for an accurate assessment of the value of the securities. The
Court found the defendants liable for failing to provide information as
to the fair value since this information either could have or might have
influenced the plaintiffs' investment decision.34
However, the Court recently stated a different standard for material-
ity in TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. " Although that case was
based upon a violation of a different section of the Act,36 the holding
depended upon a finding that certain omitted facts were material.
Northway involved the failure of TSC Industries to state facts relating
to control over its management. The Seventh Circuit in Northway37
recognized that Affiliated Ute used the "might" standard in determin-
ing materiality and therefore based its finding of liability on that stan-
dard.3 8 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the Court of Appeals
since it found that the omissions in question were not "so obviously
important that reasonable minds could not differ as to materiality."39
The Court stated that the proper standard for materiality was the sub-
stantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would, rather than might,
consider the information important in making his decision.4" Although
[Tihe defendants devised a plan and induced the [plaintiffs] to dispose of their shares
without disclosing to them material facts that reasonably could have been expected to
influence their decisions to sell. . . . [F]acts withheld [are] material in the sense that a
reasonable investor might have considered them important in the making of [his] deci-
sion. . . .(emphasis added).
34. Id.
35. 426 U.S. 438 (1976).
36. Northway involved an alleged proxy solicitation violation under 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)
(1976). The rule promulgated by the Securities Exchange Commission under that section
(rule 14a-9) provides in pertinent part:
(a) No solicitation subject to this regulation shall be made by means of any proxy
statement, form of proxy, notice of meeting or other communication, written or oral,
containing any statement which, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under
which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material fact, or which omits
to state any materialfact necessary in order to make the statements therein not false or
misleading or necessary to correct any statement in any earlier communication with
respect to the solicitation of a proxy for the same meeting or subject matter which has
become false or misleading.
17 C.F.R. 240.14a-9 1978 (emphasis added). See also Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489
F.2d 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 873 (1974) (analysis under § 14(a) and § 10(b) is
identical).
37. 512 F.2d 324 (7th Cir. 1975).
38. Id. at 331-32.
39. 426 U.S. at 452-53. The Court noted that Affiliated Ute was not dispositive on the
question of materiality since the Court's language was not used to precisely define material-
ity, but rather to state that positive proof of reliance is unnecessary when materiality has
been established. Id. at 447 n.9.
40. Id. at 449.
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Northway was not decided in light of rule lOb-5, at least one court has
recognized the controversy raised by Northway.
41
In Nelson, the district court applied the "would" standard previously
adopted by the Ninth Circuit and found that the facts regarding the
PRTA control group and its long range plans were materially mislead-
ing.4 2 On appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit expressly stated that the
less harsh "could" standard announced in Affiliated Ute was the appro-
priate measure by which to judge materiality.43 Yet the court did not
clearly distinguish the two standards since it found, on the facts before
it, that the stricter "would" standard was met. By referring to the
"could" standard without further discussion, the Ninth Circuit in
Nelson not only created confusion, but added fuel to the fire regarding
the proper standard by which to judge materiality.
The confusion as to what information will be considered material
within the context of rule lOb-5 is exacerbated by the Ninth Circuit's
use of the terms "book value" and "fair market value" in determining
materiality in Nelson. The Court of Appeals agreed with the district
court that Korth's request for information regarding the status of the
shares demanded a more detailed response than that which he received,
especially in light of Korth's belief that $5.00 per share represented the
fair market value of the stock and Coie's knowledge of this reliance. 44
According to the Ninth Circuit, this response should have included the
fact that a group of shareholders had joined to acquire control of the
telephone company and had plans to turn the company into a marketa-
ble commodity. The court concluded that knowledge of these facts
would have influenced plaintiff's decision to sell.45
However, the evidence does not clearly support the court's rapid con-
clusion that these omissions would have in fact influenced plaintiff's
decision to sell. Although the court stated that the evidence supported
Korth's erroneous assumption that $5.00 represented the fair market
value, it repeatedly made references to the parallel book values of the
PRTA stock.46 The court failed to explain the correlation between
41. See Lewelling v. First Cal. Co., 564 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1977). "[Tihe Supreme Court
has yet to announce a precise test for materiality under Rule lOb-5. In the Ninth Circuit, the
[would] formulation controls." Id. at 1279 n.3.
42. 576 F.2d at 1336. See also cases cited-note 31 supra.
43. Id. at 1335.
44. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
45. "We find more than sufficient evidence to sustain the district court's findings...
[and] agree with the district court's conclusion that knowledge of these facts would have
influenced a reasonable investor's conduct." 576 F.2d at 1336.
46. The court noted that when the counter offer of $6.94 per share was made to Korth, the
book value of the PRTA stock was approximately $60.00 per share. .d. at 1335. Also, at the
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book value and fair market value,4 7 even though book value may be a
factor in determining the value of stock in a closely held corporation.4
It can be argued that the parties involved struck a fair bargain. Korth
probably realized that Serwold was closely connected with the corpora-
tion because the check mailed to Korth was Serwold's personal check.
Korth even may have known that Serwold was a director of PRTA.
The opinion is silent on these matters. Also, the court failed to state the
facts upon which it relied in the determination of the market value of
the PRTA stock at the time plaintiff sold his stock. Since market value
takes the future worth of the securities into consideration, a decision in
the lower court that $5.00 was the fair value could greatly affect subse-
quent findings. For instance, because the omitted information regard-
ing the control group and its plans might not have affected plaintiffs
decision to sell, the court might not have been as willing to find the
omissions material.
Without further guidance from the court, however, it must be as-
sumed that $5.00 per share was not far from the fair market value;
otherwise, the representation as to the value of the securities would
have been deemed a material misrepresentation. Neither court held
that the offering price of $5.00 per share was such a material misrepre-
sentation. In addition, the court maintained that Coie's statements
with respect to the lack of declared dividends were not material misrep-
resentations.49 However, the court considered all the disclosures as a
time PRTA exchanged its assets for United Utilities, Inc. stock, the shareholder received a
value of $500.00 per share; again the court stated that the book value of the PRTA stock was
approximately $163.00 per share. d. at 1335. Additionally, the court used the $60.00 book
value of the PRTA stock minus the $5.00 per share received in computing the losses to the
plaintiff. Id. at 1339 n.4.
47. The district court calculated book value as the stockholders' equity divided by the
number of PRTA's issued and outstanding shares of stock. However, it was pressed to use
the book value as the appropriate fair market value due to the lack of sales of PRTA stock
during the years 1965-1971. It is possible that the Court of Appeals adopted this approach.
48. See, e.g., Righter v. United States, 439 F.2d 1204 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (book value is a factor
in determining fair market value of closely held stock, but is of lesser importance than earn-
ings and dividends records).
49. In response to Korth's request as to the status of the shares, Coie responded that no
dividends had ever been declared and that none were anticipated because of mortgage com-
mitments. Also, Coie stated that there had never been a surplus from which dividends could
have been declared. Apparently, these representations were not found to be material be-
cause the information would not influence a sale based on the $5.00 per share figure. It
should also be noted that, unlike stock dividends, information as to a group's plan to de-
velop a company into a saleable commodity is special information of the kind which cannot
be found on the public record. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
1978]
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whole.5" As a result, while the original offer of $180.00 may have been
a fair price for the shares transferred between willing parties, the addi-
tional knowledge of a pending sale of the company was found to be
information which would affect an investor's decision to sell. Korth
did not accept the first offer for the shares. He initially inquired as to
the stock's status, and then pursued the matter by asking about divi-
dends. Obviously, he was attempting to acquire pertinent information
upon which to base a decision to sell. The court's holding that the in-
formation concerning the PRTA control group and its development
plans was material, therefore seems correct when one considers the
transaction as a whole, since materiality not only affects the investment
value of the stock, but, more importantly, affects an investor's decision
whether to sell such stock at all.
B. Scienter
"Scienter" has been defined in a variety of ways in lOb-5 actions,
including "conscious fault,"5' "wilfull or reckless disregard for the
truth,"52 and "lack of diligence, constructive fraud, or unreasonable or
negligent conduct."5 3 Unlike negligence, the concept underlying scien-
ter is a culpable mental state. Rule lOb-5 does not delineate what
mental state of the defendant must be established by the plaintiff to
impose liability.54 As a result, prior to 1976, there had never been com-
50. 576 F.2d at 1336. Rule lOb-5 requires that the statements or omissions in question be
considered in light of the surrounding circumstances in order to determine whether they are
material. See note 4 supra. See also St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 562 F.2d 1040 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978) (com-
pany's plan not material in circumstances); Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977) (parties to the action were close friends in a relation-
ship of trust and confidence; there were excessive loans to defendant's law firm and family;
under these circumstances statements that defendant company was unable to pay dividends
on preferred shares amounted to material misrepresentations); Great Western Bank & Trust
v. Kotz, 532 F.2d 1252 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (courts should construe details of act in
light of context); Robinson v. Cupples Container Co., 513 F.2d 1274 (9th Cir. 1975) (repre-
sentations must be viewed in light of the relationship of the parties, the context in which the
statement was made, the experience and bargaining position of the investor and the nature
of the transaction as well as the character of the underlying fact); Marx v. Computer Sci-
ences Corp., 507 F.2d 485 (9th Cir. 1974) (in light of great importance attached to an earn-
ings forecast, corporation's knowledge that investors would rely heavily thereon and
disparity between the parties in access to information by which to judge accuracy of the
forecast, information was material).
51. Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351, 1361-62, 1363 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1007 (1975).
52. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973) (en bane).
53. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 855 (2d Cir. 1968) (en bane), cert.
deniedsub nom. Coates v. SEC, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
54. See note 4 supra.
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plete agreement among the circuits whether "scienter" was needed in
order to hold a defendant liable in a lOb-5 action."
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court settled the controversy
when it decided Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder16 Hochfelder made it
clear that it was not the intent of Congress in formulating section 10(b)
to hold a wrongdoer liable for merely negligent acts.5 7 The Court rea-
soned that section 10(b) only proscribed intentional and wilfull conduct
since the section's words "manipulative" and "deceptive" implied that
something more than negligence was a prerequisite for imposing liabil-
ity 8 The Court therefore held that scienter was essential to a successful
lOb-5 action. It defined scienter as being "a mental state embracing an
intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."59 Although the Court indi-
cated that in certain areas of the law recklessness is also considered to
be a form of intentional conduct for some acts, it declined to decide the
question of whether recklessness or knowledge was sufficient to impose
liability on a defendant in a lOb-5 action.60
Prior to Hochfelder the Ninth Circuit's position had been stated in
55. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974) (holding negligence
sufficient under a "flexible duty" standard); Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (proof of scienter and conscious wrongdoing not
required in lOb-5 actions); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379-80 (10th Cir. 1965) (not
necessary to allege or prove common law fraud, showing of material misstatement or omis-
sion sufficient); Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963) (knowledge of falsity
not required); Royal Air Properties, Inc. v. Smith, 312 F.2d 210, 212 (9th Cir. 1962) (estab-
lishment of material facts sufficient to constitute prima facie case); Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d
270, 274 (9th Cir. 1961) (common law fraud need not be shown). But see, e.g., Carras v.
Bums, 516 F.2d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 1975) (sufficient mental state if defendant knew statement
misleading or knew of facts which would have shown it to be misleading); Clegg v. Conk,
507 F.2d 1351, 1361-62 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975) (some form of
scienter needed); Rochez Bros., Inc. v. Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402, 407-08 (3d Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 993 (1976) (in nondisclosure case, scienter requirement satisfied where de-
fendant had knowledge of information because defendant under a duty to disclose all mate-
rial facts); Smallwood v. Pearl Brewing Co., 489 F.2d 579, 606 (5th Cir.), cert. denied., 419
U.S. 873 (1974) (some culpability beyond mere negligence required); Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,
479 F.2d 1277, 1306 (2d Cir. 1973) (en banc) (willful or reckless disregard for the truth
required); Katz v. Realty Equities Corp., 406 F. Supp. 802, 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (actual
knowledge or reckless disregard for truth is prerequisite).
56. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
57. Id. at 199.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 193 n.12.
60. Id. The Court was not faced with deciding whether recklessness constituted scienter
since the facts of Hochfelder did not demand it. Knowledge has traditionally been thought
of as satisfying the scienter requirement by any definition. However, although the
Hlochfelder Court made reference to the fact that knowing conduct was equated with inten-
tional conduct, it did not include the knowledge standard within its definition. See notes 8
& 10 supra and accompanying text.
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White v. Abrams,6 which held that scienter was not an essential ele-
ment of a lOb-5 action. In White, the court set out a "flexible duty"
standard which, contrary to Hochfelder, allowed negligence as a
ground for holding a defendant liable. 2 Other circuits, however, had
insisted that negligence did not further the purpose of rule lOb-5 and
accordingly required the stricter standard of scienter. But even as to
those circuits which required a finding of scienter there had been no
unanimity as to its definition.6"
Since the district court opinion in Nelson predated Hochfelder, the
court relied upon the standard enunciated in White for the requisite
mental state of a defendant in a lOb-5 action. It also cited in its opin-
ion the Eighth Circuit case of Myzel v. Fields,64 which held that negli-
gence was a sufficient basis for the imposition of liability in a lOb-5
action.6 5 The district court found in Nelson's favor without classifying
defendants' actions as intentional.6 The district court defined scienter
as a cold-blooded or deliberate intent on the part of a defendant and
did not find that the Serwolds acted with such state of mind. The court
did, however, find that the defendants had acted more than negli-
gently6 7
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was forced to decide the case in
light of the ruling in Hochfelder.68 It concluded that the omissions by
defendants were committed either knowingly or recklessly. 69 The
61. 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
62. Id. at 730-34. The "flexible duty" standard provides that the duty imposed upon the
defendant be determined after examining factors such as the access to information or the
existence of special relationships which may impose some affirmative duty. This sliding
scale approach is a subjective test which does not preclude finding negligence as sufficient
for the imposition of liability. See also Crocker-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Control Metals,
Corp., 566 F.2d 631, 636 n.2 (9th Cir. 1977) (Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185
(1976) not inconsistent with the flexible duty standard except as to liability for mere negli-
gence). But ef Arthur Young & Co. v. United States Dist. Ct., 549 F.2d 686, 695-96 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977) (questioning the validity of the standard in light of
Hochfelder).
63. See, e.g., notes 51-53 supra and accompanying text.
64. 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
65. Plaintiffs in Myzel were induced to sell their closed corporation stock to the defend-
ants without being told of increased sales and profits and the identity of the controlling
purchasers. The court found that the defendants had deliberately set out to cheat the plain-
tiffs. Id. at 733.
66. 576 F.2d at 1337.
67. Id.
68. The district court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were filed on September
29, 1975. Hoehfelder was decided March 30, 1976 and the Nelson appeal was heard April 3,
1978.
69. 576 F.2d at 1334, 1338.
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Serwolds, as part of a control group that took an active part in the
modernization of the Poulsbo Telephone Company, were aware of the
plan to sell the company and were informed of the steady and signifi-
cant increases in earnings and book value of the shares.7" Serwold's
attorney, Coie, who was also a member of the control group, had actual
knowledge of plaintiff's assumption that $5.00 per share represented
the fair market value of the stock.7 The Nelson court maintained that
the failure of the defendants to inform plaintiff of the existing control
group and of the group's long range, albeit indefinite, plans was done
either with knowledge, or in the alternative, recklessly. 72 The Ninth
Circuit assumed that the result below was not based upon a negligence
theory since the district court "never used the word negligence or any
of its derivatives."73 This non-specificity left room for the Ninth Cir-
cuit to characterize the omissions as those made recklessly or know-
ingly.74
The court did not define what it considered "knowing conduct" to
be. In the securities field, one author has stated that behavior is know-
ing if one acts on a belief that the investor may be misled by the omis-
sion or misrepresentation,75 whereas reckless behavior has generally
been defined as "acts in conscious disregard of, or indifference to, the
risk that [the investor] will be misled. ' 76 However, the Nelson court
alluded several times to a different meaning. In its initial statement the
court declared that the defendants acted knowingly.77 When address-
ing itself to the scienter requirement the court discussed the knowledge
standard set forth in Hochfelder. The majority in Hochfelder had
stated that the language of section 10(b) "strongly suggests" knowing or
intentional misconduct, implying that knowing behavior was intended
by Congress to sustain liability.78 The Nelson court then found that the
defendants acted "with knowledge" of the omitted information.7 9
70. Id. at 1337-38.
71. Id. at 1338. See also note 19 supra and accompanying text.
72. Id. at 1337-38.
73. Id.
74. "The evidence supports a finding of recklessness. . . [which] would also be consistent
with the district court's findings." Id. at 1338.
75. See, e.g., Ruder, Texas Gulf Sulphur-The SecondRound: Priviy and State of Mind in
Rule 10b-5 Purchase and Sales Cases, 63 Nw. L. REv. 423, 436 (1968).
76. Id.
77. 576 F.2d at 1334.
78. 425 U.S. 185, 197 (1976).
79. "It appears that the defendants' omissions were, at the very least, with knowledge.
They knew of the control group, the outstanding, but still indefinite plans to sell. . . and the
steady and significant increases in earning. . . ." 576 F.2d at 1337-38 (citation omitted).
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That the defendants had knowledge of the control group and its
plans is undisputed. However, to assert that the defendants acted
knowingly, with a state of mind to conceal what they knew in order to
mislead the plaintiff, is quite different. Once the court determined that
the information omitted was material, it was required to determine
whether the omissions were withheld with the intent to mislead. It ap-
pears that because the defendants were found to have had knowledge
of the material information, the court assumed that failure to divulge
such information indicated an intent to mislead. Even if the omissions
were material, they may not have been withheld either knowingly or
recklessly. If the defendants gave a fair offer for the stock, then it
would be reasonable to find that the additional information was with-
held with a good faith belief that the decision to sell would not be af-
fected. The court imputed a culpable state of mind to the defendants
merely because they had knowledge of certain information and failed
to impart that information to the plaintiff.
By this analysis, the Ninth Circuit held that knowing behavior was
sufficient under Hochfelder for the imposition of liability.8° In effect, it
reviewed the evidence and made findings which allowed the district
court's holding to fall within the Hochfelder rule. Even though the
Ninth Circuit did not clearly find that defendants acted with the belief
that plaintiff might have been misled by the nondisclosure of the mate-
rial information, its inclusion of knowledge within the scienter defini-
tion is not a significant expansion.
The more difficult question is whether the Hochfelder scienter defini-
tion should be expanded to include recklessness. The Ninth Circuit
recognized that Hochfelder had left this question open, and it pro-
ceeded to answer the question in the affirmative by concluding that
liability should be premised on knowing or reckless behavior. It stated
that "the district court could have found Coie reckless in his evaluation
of the 'status' of the stock, and imputed that recklessness to the defend-
ants."'" When the Ninth Circuit held that a finding of recklessness is
sufficient to impose liability, it was not the first circuit to do so. Several
other circuits have held, both prior to and after Hochfelder, that reck-
lessness was either sufficient or necessary for the imposition of liability
in a lOb-5 action. 2
80. Id. at 1337, 1338.
81. Id. at 1338.
82. See, e.g., Sunstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977) (intentional or reckless test correct); Dupuy v. Du-
puy, 551 F.2d 1005, 1020 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 911 (1977) (Hochfelder standard is
at least recklessness); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 535 F.2d 982, 993 (7th Cir. 1976) (gross
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The court in Nelson believed that reckless behavior was intended by
Congress to support lOb-5 liability.83 The Nelson court found that the
purpose of the rule would be accomplished only by including reckless-
ness within the Hochfelder requirement and thus giving a broad inter-
pretation of scienter. The Securities Exchange Commission itself has
also argued for an expansive reading of section 10(b) to effect the over-
all congressional purpose of protecting investors against injury from
false and deceptive practices.84 The Commission enacted rule lOb-5
specifically to eliminate all manipulative and deceptive methods in the
sale of securities.85 Also, to protect investors from fraud and to en-
courage the widest possible dissemination of accurate information, the
Supreme Court has repeatedly insisted that courts construe the rules
"not technically and restrictively, but flexibly in order to effectuate
[their] remedial purpose[s]." 86
Nelson involved material omissions rather than affirmative misrepre-
sentations. Finding knowing conduct by implication in order to satisfy
the requisite degree of culpability is therefore noteworthy. The result
is, that those with information are required not only to make accurate
statements, but to disclose such information or risk lOb-5 liability. The
mere possession of material information could itself fulfill the scienter
requirement since some form of intent to mislead can be inferred from
that possession. At first blush this requirement seems to be harsh.
However, in light of the policy to encourage full disclosure of informa-
tion to investors, the standard for material omissions should be no dif-
ferent than that for material misrepresentations. The nondisclosure of
negligence and wanton ignorance of situation); City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 422 F.2d
221, 229-30 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970) (proof of scienter not required). But
f Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir. 1977) ("definition of 'reckless
behavior' should not be a liberal one lest any discernible distinction between scienter and
negligence be obliterated"). See also Bucklo, The Supreme Court Attempts to Defne Scienter
Under Rule 10b-5: Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 29 STAN. L. REv. 213, 235 (1977) (the great
bulk of decisions and the more influential scholarly comments have argued that recklessness
should suffice) [hereinafter cited as Bucklo].
83. 576 F.2d at 1337.
84. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197-98 (1976).
85. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977). See also Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 73 F. Supp. 798, 800 (E.D. Pa. 1947) (private cause of action under lOb-5 held
to serve purpose of rule).
86. See, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972); Superin-
tendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971); SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 195 (1963). Accord, Desser v. Ashton, 408 F. Supp.
1174, 1176 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), aI'd, 573 F.2d 1289 (2d Cir. 1977). See also Bucklo, supra note
82.
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information can be as harmful to an enlightened investment decision as
affirmative misrepresentations.
By its terse treatment, the Ninth Circuit has not provided any clear
guidelines by which to evaluate knowing or reckless conduct. In
stretching the scienter meaning, the court must have been anxious to
resolve the issue left unanswered by Hochfelder. But it should have
waited for a factual situation which would have provided a firmer basis
for its position. The Ninth Circuit here has strained to find facts to fit
the outcome. After the confusion, the court emerges with what appears
to be an unavoidable result; namely, that recklessness is a form of sci-
enter. The effectiveness of Nelson is diluted because of this lack of
forthrightness.
C The Remedy
Relatively few cases based on a lOb-5 violation have been presented
on appeal with respect to the appropriate remedy. One reason for this
is that plaintiffs infrequently prove all the elements of the claim for
relief so the court rarely reaches the question of damages.8 7 In cases
where the court has examined the issue of damages, the plaintiff seller
has often received the difference between the actual price paid and the
amount defendant should have paid at the time of the sale had there
been no fraudulent conduct.88
Affiliated Vte Citizens v. United States 9 is the leading case on the
measure of damages for defrauded sellers in lOb-5 actions. There Jus-
tice Blackmun stated for the seven members of the Court:90
[Tihe correct measure of damages ... is the difference between the fair
87. E.g., Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1338 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 464
(1978).
88. See, e.g., Harris v. American Investment Co., 523 F.2d 220,225 n.4 (8th Cir. 1975) (en
banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054 (1976). See generally 6 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION,
3922-23 (Supp. 1969). Nelson involves a plaintiff seller who was defrauded in a face-to-face
transaction. The measure of damages in other situations has considerations which are not
present in Nelson. For instance, the potential draconian liability that plagued Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974) does not affect the
decision in Nelson, since that case involved a defrauded buyer in an over-the-counter trans-
action. The potential for tremendous liability to all investors who purchased in the open
market during the applicable period is a factor which, right or wrong, has a tendency to
affect a judge's decision not only as to liability, but also as to the measure of damages. See
generally Note, The Measure of Damages in Rule 10b-5 Cases Involving Acilvely Traded
Securities, 26 STAN L. REv. 371 (1974).
89. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
90. Two justices, Powell and Rehnquist, did not participate in the opinion. Although
Justice Douglas dissented in part with respect to the United States' waiver of sovereign im-
munity, he joined in the Court's opinion and judgment as to the application of the theory.
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value of all that the ... seller received and the fair value of what he
would have received had there been no fraudulent conduct,. . . except
for the situation where the defendant received more than the seller's ac-
tual loss. In the latter case damages are the amount of the defendant's
profit.91
This measure of damages is based upon a contractual setting and plain-
tiff is made whole by forcing defendant to relinquish all gains.
This rescissory theory computes the difference between the value of
the stock as of the date of the sale and the value as of the date the
wrongdoer was under a present duty to return the stock. This duty
accrues at the date of judgment, although courts generally employ an
earlier post-transaction date.92 True rescission calls for a cancellation
of the bargain and a return of the parties to the status quo ante the
sale.93 There are, however, several situations where this theory cannot
be literally applied. If it is impractical to return the stock, such as when
it has been profitably disposed of or retired, and true rescission is there-
fore impossible, this theory provides that the equivalent value of the
stock at the time of disposal or judgment is the proper measure of
plaintiff's losses.9 4 Alternatively, if the stock has declined in value or
has been sold by the wrongdoer at a loss, the plaintiff may then seek to
recover the difference between the price paid and the actual value at
the date of the sale.95 In other words, depending upon the circum-
stances, the plaintiff should be given either the defendant's profits or
plaintiff's losses, whichever is greater. Because the day of judgment
may be years away from the time of the sale, rescissory relief may in-
clude future accretions not foreseeable at the time of the original trans-
fer. This theory, then, awards the plaintiff all of defendant's profits,
whether foreseeable or not.96 As a result, it not only provides full com-
91. 406 U.S. at 155 (citations omitted).
92. See generally Bucklo, supra note 82.
93. See, e.g., Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718,742 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951
(1968) (if the contract is void, then plaintiff is entitled to restitution of what he sold).
94. Id. at 742-45 (plaintiffs prayed for either rescission or money damages; since the stock
was no longer available and return in specie was therefore impossible, the equivalent mone-
tary value was the proper amount of judgment).
95. These are "out-of-pocket" damages. This theory is discussed at notes 97-102 infra
and accompanying text.
96. The possible exception to this rule occurs where special or unique efforts on the part
of the defendant contributed greatly to the stock's increase in value. In this instance, in-
creases in value attributed to defendant's special efforts will not be subject to recovery by
plaintiff. See, e.g., Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 787 (1st Cir.), cer. denied, 382 U.S. 879
(1965). Also, consequential damages arising from fraud may be awarded to the plaintiff.
Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357, 1360 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S.
951 (1978).
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pensation for injury to plaintiff, but also serves to remove any incentive
for engaging in wrongful conduct.
There are, however, other remedies which have been considered by
the courts in lOb-5 actions. The one most often used as an alternative
to the rescissory theory is commonly designated as the "out-of-pocket"
theory. The out-of-pocket theory allows recovery of the difference be-
tween the fair market value of the securities at the date of the sale and
the purchase price. 7 It is based upon the tort of deceit, rather than a
contract theory, and enforces a primary purpose of the private right of
action under rule lOb-5, ie., to compensate for damages caused by
fraudulent acts. Unlike the rescissory theory, the out-of-pocket theory
restricts the amount for which the defendant may be liable and there-
fore supports the premise that Congress did not intend anyone to be an
insurer against false or misleading statements.98
The out-of-pocket theory was discussed in the Ninth Circuit case of
Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp.99 Defendants had engaged in an
unlawful scheme that violated section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Improper
accounting practices and exaggerated press releases resulted in an
artificially inflated price of defendant's stock. As a result of the wrong-
ful acts, plaintiff, among others who relied upon the misrepresentations
and reports, alleged that she was damaged when she purchased the
stock."°° The out-of-pocket theory was advanced since it measures the
difference between the purchase price and the value of the stock at the
date of purchase. In Green, that difference represented the extent to
which the purchaser plaintiff had been required to invest greater than
otherwise would have been necessary. Also, as pointed out by Judge
Sneed in a concurring opinion, the theory was appropriate since the
corporate defendant itself never received the inflated purchase price
and therefore realized no "il-gotten" gains.101 To permit recovery in
an amount other than the difference between the fair market value of
the securities and the purchase price would have been to unduly bur-
den the defendant with losses which it neither caused nor for which it
assumed responsibility. 2 However, this measure of damages is not a
97. See, e.g., Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634 (7th Cir. 1963).
98. See, e.g., White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 728 (9th Cir. 1974) (citing Kohn v. Ameri-
can Metal Climax, Inc., 458 F.2d 255, 280 (3d Cir.) (Adams, J. concurring & dissenting), cerl.
denied, 409 U.S. 874 (1972).
99. 541 F.2d 1335, 1346 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam) (Sneed, J., concurring in part &
concurring in the result in part).
100. Id. at 1338.
101. Id. at 1341-42 n.2 (Sneed, J. concurring).
102. Id. at 1343 (Sneed, J. concurring). Green was brought as a class action and the
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talisman. Often the evil perpetrated is not merely an inflated purchase
price, but the fact that plaintiff was induced to buy without full disclo-
sure. As a result, only the rescissory measure could remedy this evil
since it could recover the wrongdoer's profits as well as the plaintiffs
losses.
The plaintiff in Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co. ' 03 was induced to
buy bonds and the court applied the rescissory measure for the remedy.
The defendants were found to have violated rule 1Ob-5 since they made
untrue representations as to the risk-free nature of the bonds which
they were recommending to plaintiff for investment. The material mis-
representations, however, resulted only in plaintiff purchasing the
bonds at the then fair market value."° If the out-of-pocket theory had
been applied, plaintiff would have recovered nothing, since the market
value of the bonds on the date of purchase was the same as the value
which plaintiff paid. The Eighth Circuit held, therefore, that the recis-
sory theory was the proper means of compensating plaintiff for the
wrong perpetrated upon him. According to the court, the fact that
plaintiff purchased the bonds at all was the gravamen of the action.1
0 5
The court returned the parties to the status quo by requiring the de-
fendants to bear the risk of the investment and awarding plaintiff the
losses he suffered. The court reasoned that plaintiffs losses stemming
from the decline in value of the bonds were a consequence of defend-
ants' fraud; any losses attributable to market forces should be borne by
the wrongdoer.
1 0 6
The rescissory theory is more effective than the out-of-pocket theory
in deterring wrongful conduct because it substitutes the philosophy of
caveat emptor with that of full disclosure. The courts have employed
both theories for the measure of losses, depending upon the nature of
the violation. However, the court's choice of either the out-of-pocket or
rescissory theory also reflects the individual court's philosophy as to the
corporate defendant was also potentially liable to all other investors who purchased Occi-
dental's stock in the open market. See note 88 supra.
103. 559 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 951 (1978).
104. Id. at 1359-60.
105. Id. The plaintiff was not a sophisticated trader but characteristically the average,
individual investor. He purchased the bonds late in 1972 and the fraud became apparent in
August, 1974. Id.
106. Id. at 1361. The court listened to defendant's argument that the out-of-pocket theory
as articulated by Judge Sneed in Green v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 541 F.2d 1335, 1342
(9th Cir. 1976) (concurring opinion), was applicable since the plaintiff should not recover for
losses due to the market forces. However, the court decided that the rescissory theory was
the appropriate measure because defendants should be held liable for their wrongful con-
cealment of the risks attendant to the transaction.
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purpose of rule lOb-5. The earlier cases involving lOb-5 awards
adopted the attitude that the buyer should be aware of the risks inher-
ent in the securities market due to its speculative nature, and thus en-
couraged investor diligence as a means of promoting efficiency in the
market. The out-of-pocket theory was appropriate to implement this
outlook since it provided compensation for wrongful conduct while
also limiting amounts due to loss of expectancy. But the trend over the
years has been for courts to protect the investor from misrepresenta-
tions and nondisclosures by focusing on the culpable conduct of the
defendant and by requiring full disgorgement of profits resulting from
that conduct. The courts have thus adopted a more punitive approach
to rule lOb-5 liability by removing all incentive to engage in wrongful
activity.
In 1965, the First Circuit articulated this view in Janigan v. Taylor.
10 7
"It is more appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit even of
windfalls than to let the fraudulent party keep them. . . .[I]t is simple
equity that a wrongdoer should disgorge his fraudulent enrichment."'' 08
The rescissory theory allows for recovery of losses due to market forces.
This, in effect, makes the defendant an insurer of his conduct since he
may be forced to compensate plaintiff for more than the actual losses
sustained by the plaintiff. The rationale underlying this theory is that
the ill-gotten gains which accrue to the defendant justify a shifting of
the risk of loss from the plaintiff to the defendant. 0 9
This is the theme of Nelson v. Serwold."l0 The Ninth Circuit in
Nelson acknowledged that the law on the appropriate remedy in 1Ob-5
actions was still in its formative stage and therefore unsettled. How-
ever, it chose to follow the trend of disgorging the wrongdoer's profits
rather than merely compensating plaintiff for losses."' It would have
107. 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
108. Id. at 786.
109. E.g., Garnatz v. Stifel, Nicolaus & Co., 559 F.2d 1357 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 951 (1978). Discussed at notes 103-06 supra and accompanying text.
110. 576 F.2d 1332 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 464 (1978).
111. In Nelson, the district court judge found that defendants had not deliberately con-
cealed the material information. He applied the flexible duty standard of White v. Abrams,
495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974), finding a technical violation of rule lOb-5, but found that the
defendants lacked scienter. This lack of scienter required an award of less than complete
disgorgement. The judge, relying primarily upon Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718 (8th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968), believed that only when the fraud involved was
"apparent and extensive" should disgorgement of future profits be applied. Also, the ex-
change with United Utilities, Inc. took place six and one-half years after the sale in question.
According to the district court, no decision yet has required a defendant to disgorge profits
earned more than two years after the original transfer. Additionally, the district judge be-
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been possible for the Nelson court to apply the out-of-pocket theory in
assessing damages. Assuming the fair market value of the PRTA stock
was $60.00 per share, the plaintiff could have been given the difference
between that amount and the price paid of $6.94 per share.1 12 Propo-
nents of this method might contend that this compensatory amount is
all that plaintiff actually suffered, and hence all that he should receive.
However, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the defendants should not
benefit from their wrongdoing. The exchange with United Utilities,
Inc. was for $500.00 per share. Application of the out-of-pocket theory
would still have left the wrongdoers with a profit of $440.00 per share.
The Ninth Circuit, adopting the Janigan v. Taylor 1 3 rationale,
awarded plaintiff all of the defendant's profits from the transaction,
emphasizing that those who knowingly or recklessly fail to disclose all
material information should not benefit by their wrongful nondisclo-
sures.
Nelson does not imply that the rescissory theory will always be ap-
plied when assessing damages. However, in situations where a plaintiff
seller is defrauded in a face-to-face transaction, as in Nelson, the rescis-
sory theory should be applied to better serve the purposes of section
10(b) and rule lOb-5. In light of the Hochfelder scienter requirement,
by which negligence will no longer suffice to hold a defendant liable, it
is not unjust to require a defendant to give up all gains which were
obtained as a result of the wrongdoing.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit continues in its broad and flexible interpretation
of rule lOb-5. Even within the rule set by Hochfelder, excluding negli-
gence as a basis for liability, the court has construed the exclusion nar-
rowly by interpreting the intent requirement to include recklessness or
knowledge. In sum, although scienter has been defined in a variety of
ways, it should include within its ambit reckless or knowing miscon-
duct. Courts must be given this flexibility in interpreting rule lOb-5 to
better implement the intention of Congress in protecting investors from
unfair and inequitable practices. With this governing principle estab-
lished, however, there stands the invitation to the courts to engage in
lieved that the defendants' own personal efforts contributed to the increase in stock value
and that profits of that nature should not be subject to recovery by the seller plaintiff.
112. The court determined that the loss to plaintiff was $60.00 less the $5.00 received. Id.
at 1339 n.4. However, the plaintiff actually received $6.94 per share. Id. at 1335. See also
note 46 supra and accompanying text.
113. 344 F.2d 781 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965).
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the common battle of applying the particular facts of the case to the
standard. As has been the case with scienter, there may emerge as
many different definitions of "reckless" as there are circuits.
The Ninth Circuit has continued the current trend in allowing plain-
tiff sellers to recover defendant's profits rather than limiting damages to
plaintiff's actual losses, thus enforcing dual purposes of the Act-those
of encouraging full disclosure and of protecting investors from fraud.
In all probability this approach of disgorging the defendant's profits,
even to the extent of giving plaintiff a windfall, will not always be ap-
plied and the courts will continue to wrestle with the proper measure of
damages in cases where plaintiffs are many in number and the transac-
tion is in the open market. Ultimately, the outcome of each case will
continue to depend upon its individual facts. Nelson v. Serwold does
not provide a definitive solution to the question of the measure of dam-
ages. It merely establishes that the rescissory theory may be applied
when appropriate.
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